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TCL	v.	Ericsson:	The	First	Major	U.S.	Top-Down	FRAND	Royalty	Decision	
	
	
Jorge	L.	Contreras1	
Patently-O	Blog,	Dec.	27,	2018	
	
On	December	 21,	 2017,	 the	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 Central	 District	 of	 California	 released	 its	 long-
awaited	Memorandum	of	Findings	of	Fact	and	Conclusions	of	Law	in	TCL	Communications	v.	Ericsson.2		
In	 a	 lengthy	 and	 carefully	 crafted	 decision,	 Judge	 James	 Selna	 sets	 forth	 some	 important	 new	 points	
regarding	 the	 calculation	 of	 fair,	 reasonable	 and	 non-discriminatory	 (FRAND)	 royalties	 for	 standards-
essential	patents	(SEPs).		Among	other	things,	the	decision	offers	a	strong	endorsement	of	“top	down”	
methodologies	for	the	calculation	of	SEP	royalties,	and	makes	significant	use	of	the	non-discrimination	
(ND)	prong	of	the	FRAND	commitment	in	arriving	at	a	FRAND	royalty	rate.		Equally	importantly,	the	case	
establishes	 that,	 for	 non-discrimination	 purposes,	 even	 low	 end	 vendors	 like	 TCL	 will	 be	 considered	
“similarly	 situated”	 to	high	end	vendors	 like	Apple,	giving	 them	the	benefit	of	 the	 rates	 that	high	end	
vendors	can	negotiate	with	SEP	holders	for	far	more	expensive	consumer	products.	
	
Background	
	
The	case	involves	the	sale	of	cellular	handsets	by	TCL,	a	Chinese	firm	reported	to	be	the	seventh	largest	
global	manufacturer	of	mobile	phones.		Ericsson	is	one	of	the	largest	holders	of	patents	essential	to	the	
implementation	 of	 the	 2G,	 3G	 and	 4G	 wireless	 telecommunications	 standards	 published	 by	 the	
European	Telecommunications	Standards	 Institute	 (ETSI)	 (standards-essential	patents	or	SEPs).	 	Under	
ETSI’s	policies,	ETSI	participants	are	required	to	grant	licenses	under	their	SEPs	to	implementers	of	ETSI	
standards	on	terms	that	are	fair,	reasonable	and	non-discriminatory	(FRAND).		
	
In	2007,	TCL	obtained	a	7-year	license	under	Ericsson’s	patents	covering	ETSI’s	2G	standards.	 	 In	2011,	
the	 parties	 began	 to	 negotiate	 a	 license	 under	 Ericsson’s	 3G	 SEPs,	 and	 in	 2013,	 these	 negotiations	
expanded	to	 include	Ericsson’s	4G	SEPs.	Over	the	next	several	years,	the	parties	were	unable	to	reach	
agreement	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 this	 license,	 and	 during	 the	 course	 of	 negotiations,	 Ericsson	 sued	 TCL	 for	
infringement	of	its	SEPs	in	six	non-U.S.	jurisdictions.		In	March	2014,	prior	to	the	expiration	of	TCL’s	2G	
license,	TCL	filed	an	action	in	the	Central	District	of	California	seeking	a	judicial	declaration	that	Ericsson	
breached	 its	 obligation	 to	 offer	 TCL	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	 terms.	 	 TCL	 agreed	 to	 abide	 by	 the	 court’s	
determination	of	FRAND	terms	for	a	worldwide	license	under	Ericsson’s	2G,	3G	and	4G	SEPs	(slip	op.	at	
p.9).		Partially	based	on	this	assurance,	in	June	2015	the	court	entered	an	“anti-suit	injunction”	against	
																																								 																				
1	Professor	of	Law,	University	of	Utah	S.J.	Quinney	College	of	Law	and	Senior	Fellow,	Centre	for	International	
Governance	Innovation	(CIGI).		This	paper	was	originally	published	on	the	Patently-O	blog	on	Dec.	27,	2017,	with	
thanks	to	Professors	Dennis	Crouch	and	Jason	Rantanen.		Since	then,	there	have	been	several	developments.	First,	
Ericsson	has	appealed	the	decision	in	this	case.		Second,	additional	valuable	commentary	has	been	published,	inter	
alia,	by	Tom	Cotter	(Thoughts	on	the	TCL	v.	Ericsson	FRAND	Decision,	Comparative	Patent	Remedies	blog	Jan.	2,	
2018,	http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/01/thoughts-on-tcl-v-ericsson-frand.html	(offering	
valuable	comparison	and	contrast	with	the	Unwired	Planet	v.	Huawei	decision),	Rajiv	Choudhry,	Determination	of	
FRAND	royalty-	TCL	v.	Ericsson	LM,	SpicyIP	blog,	Dec.	31,	2017,	https://spicyip.com/2017/12/determination-of-
frand-royalty-tcl-v-ericsson-lm.html	(focus	on	implications	for	India),	and	David	Long,	Judge	Selna	determines	
FRAND	Rate	and	enters	contract-type	injunction	on	ETSI	SEPs	(TCL	v.	Ericsson),	Essential	Patent	Blog,	Jan.	3,	2018,	
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/01/judge-selna-determines-frand-rate-enters-contract-type-
injunction-etsi-seps-tcl-v-ericsson/#more-7743	).	
2	TCL	 Communications	 v.	 Ericsson,	Memorandum	of	 Findings	 of	 Fact	 and	Conclusions	 of	 Law	 (C.D.	 Cal.,	 Dec.	 21,	
2017,	SACV	14-341	JVS(DFMx)	and	CV	15-2370	JVS	(DFMx)).	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100976 
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Ericsson,	prohibiting	 it	 from	pursuing	 further	 infringement	 litigation	against	TCL	until	 the	resolution	of	
the	FRAND	issues.3		The	court	ruled	that	the	nature	of	TCL’s	claims	was	equitable,4	making	it	suitable	for	
judicial	 (rather	than	 jury)	determination,	and	a	10-day	bench	trial	was	held	 in	early	2017.	 	The	court’s	
decision	was	rendered	in	November	2017,	and	a	public	version	was	released	in	December	2017	in	which	
certain	competitive	information	was	redacted.	
	
FRAND	Royalties	
	
Numerous	 U.S.	 cases	 have	made	 clear	 that	 a	 FRAND	 royalty	must	 be	 “premised	 on	 the	 value	 of	 the	
patented	 feature,	 not	 any	 value	 added	 by	 the	 standard’s	 adoption	 of	 the	 patented	 technology	…	 [so	
that]	 the	 royalty	 award	 is	 based	 on	 the	 incremental	 value	 that	 the	 patented	 invention	 adds	 to	 the	
product,	not	any	value	added	by	the	standardization	of	that	technology”.5		Unlike	the	recent	UK	decision	
in	Unwired	Planet	v.	Huawei,	which	held	that	there	is	but	a	single	FRAND	rate	applicable	to	any	given	set	
of	parties	and	SEPs,6	Judge	Selna	in	TCL	v.	Ericsson	holds	that	there	is	no	single	FRAND	rate.7	
	
Top-Down	vs.	Bottom-Up	Royalty	Calculations		
	
There	are	 two	general	 schools	of	 thought	 regarding	 the	 calculation	of	 SEP	 royalties	 subject	 to	 FRAND	
commitments:	 bottom-up	 and	 top-down.	 	 “Bottom-up”	 approaches	 attempt	 to	 assess	 the	 value	 of	
asserted	SEPs	in	isolation,	using	comparable	license	agreements	and	other	methodologies,	but	without	
significant	reference	to	other	patents	covering	the	same	standard.8		 In	contrast,	 top-down	approaches	
first	determine	the	aggregate	royalty	that	should	be	paid	for	all	SEPs	covering	a	particular	standard,	and	
then	allocate	an	appropriate	portion	of	the	total	to	the	asserted	SEPs.9		
	
Top-down	approaches	were	used	by	 the	UK	 court	 in	 in	Unwired	Planet10	and	by	 the	 Japanese	 IP	High	
Court	in	Apple	Japan	v.	Samsung.11		And	in	November	2017,	the	European	Commission	emphasized	in	its	
Communication	on	SEPs	that	“an	individual	SEP	cannot	be	considered	in	isolation.	Parties	need	to	take	
																																								 																				
3 See	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras	 &	 Michael	 Eixenberger,	 The	 Anti-Suit	 Injunction:	 A	 Transnational	 Remedy	 for	 Multi-
Jurisdictional	 SEP	 Litigation	 in	 CAMBRIDGE	HANDBOOK	OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDIZATION	 LAW:	COMPETITION,	ANTITRUST,	 AND	
PATENTS,	 Ch.	 27	 (Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 ed.,	 2017)	 (discussing	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 in	 SEP	 cases,	 including	 TCL	 v.	
Ericsson). 
4	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	8.	
5	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	108	(quoting	Ericsson	v.	D-Link,	773	F.3d	at	1232-33	(Fed.	Cir.	2014)).	
6	[2017]	EWHC	711	(Pat)	(5	Apr.	2017)	at	¶804(4).		See	Jorge	L.	Contreras,	Global	Markets,	Competition,	and	FRAND	
Royalties:	 The	Many	 Implications	 of	 Unwired	 Planet	 v.	 Huawei,	 16	 ANTITRUST	 SOURCE	 17	 (Aug.	 2017)	 (discussing	
Unwired	 Planet	 case)	 and	Norman	 Siebrasse	&	 Thomas	 F.	 Cotter,	 Judicially	 Determined	 FRAND	 Royalties	 in	 THE	
CAMBRIDGE	HANDBOOK	OF	TECHNICAL	STANDARDIZATION	LAW:	COMPETITION,	ANTITRUST,	AND	PATENTS	 (Jorge	L.	Contreras,	ed.,	
2017).	
7	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	109.	
8 	See,	 e.g.,	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 Aggregated	 Royalties	 for	 Top-Down	 FRAND	 Determinations:	 Revisiting	 ‘Joint	
Negotiation’,	62	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	690	 (2017)	 (critiquing	bottom-up	methodologies);	 Jason	R.	Bartlett	&	 Jorge	L.	
Contreras,	Rationalizing	FRAND	Royalties:	Can	 Interpleader	Save	the	 Internet	of	Things?,	36	REV.	LITIG.	285	(2017)	
(same).	
9	See,	e.g.,	Contreras,	Aggregated	Royalties,	supra	note	8	 (discussing	top-down	royalty	calculations);	Siebrasse	&	
Cotter,	supra	note	6.	
10	[2017]	EWHC	711	(Pat)	(5	Apr.	2017).	
11	Apple	 Japan	Godo	Kaisha	 v.	 Samsung	 Electronics	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 IP	High	Court	 of	 Japan,	 2013	 (Ne)	 10043	 (May	 16,	
2014).	 See	 also	 Contreras,	 Aggregated	 Royalties,	 supra	 note	 8	 	 (discussing	 top-down	 royalty	 calculations	 in	
Unwired	Planet	and	Apple	Japan).	
Contreras	 	 TCL	v.	Ericsson	3	
into	 account	 a	 reasonable	 aggregate	 rate	 for	 the	 standard,	 assessing	 the	 overall	 added	 value	 of	 the	
technology”.12	However,	with	 the	 exception	 of	 In	 re.	 Innovatio	 IP	 Ventures,13	most	U.S.	 courts	making	
FRAND	royalty	determinations	have	used	bottom-up	methodologies	heavily	dependent	on	an	analysis	of	
comparable	licenses.14	
	
In	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	Judge	Selna	largely	adopts	the	top-down	methodology	proposed	by	TCL	(see	below).	
He	notes	 that	 the	 “appeal	 of	 a	 top	down	approach	 is	 that	 it	 prevents	 royalty	 stacking”,	which	occurs	
when	individual	SEP	holders	each	demand	a	royalty	that,	when	combined,	can	be	excessive.15			
	
However,	 the	 court	 also	 notes	 that	 top-down	methods	 cannot	 assess	 whether	 the	 licensor	 complied	
with	 the	non-discrimination	prong	of	 the	FRAND	commitment.	 	Accordingly,	 Judge	Selna	undertakes	a	
separate	non-discrimination	analysis	based	principally	on	the	review	of	comparable	licenses	(discussed	
below).	 	He	 then	 combines	 the	 top-down	and	 comparables	 approaches	 to	determine	 the	appropriate	
FRAND	royalty	rate.	
	
The	Aggregate	Rate	
	
A	 top-down	 royalty	 calculation	 methodology	 has	 two	 steps:	 	 determining	 the	 aggregate	 SEP	 royalty	
applicable	 to	a	 standard,	 then	allocating	an	appropriate	portion	of	 the	 total	 to	 the	asserted	SEPs.	 	As	
noted	above,	the	UK	and	Japanese	courts	that	applied	top-down	methodologies	in	FRAND	cases	based	
their	aggregate	rates	on	public	statements	made	by	SEP	holders	and	other	market	participants.16		Judge	
Selna	 also	 adopts	 this	 approach,	 citing	 various	 public	 statements	 and	 press	 releases	 by	 Ericsson	 that	
support	an	aggregate	royalty	of	5%	on	the	2G	and	3G	standards	and	a	rate	between	6%	and	10%	on	the	
4G	standard.17	While	the	court	acknowledges	that	this	method	“is	not	perfect”,18	one	of	its	merits	is	its	
dependence	on	statements	made	by	Ericsson	itself	to	induce	the	market	to	adopt	standards	covered	by	
its	own	SEPs.19	
	
Allocation	of	Ericsson’s	Proportional	Share	
	
Once	an	aggregate	royalty	rate	for	all	SEPs	covering	a	standard	has	been	determined,	the	appropriate	
portion	 must	 be	 allocated	 to	 the	 SEPs	 asserted	 in	 the	 case.	 	 In	 TCL	 v.	 Ericsson,	 this	 determination	
involved	 two	 contentious	 steps:	 determining	 the	 total	 number	 of	 SEPs	 covering	 each	 standard	 (the	
denominator),	then	determining	Ericsson’s	share	of	those	SEPs	(the	numerator).		The	percentage	of	SEPs	
held	by	the	SEP	holder	is	the	quotient	of	the	numerator	divided	by	the	denominator.			
	
	 Essentiality.	 It	 is	 well	 known	 in	 the	 literature	 that	many	 patents	 declared	 by	 their	 owners	 as	
																																								 																				
12	European	Commission,		Communication	From	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	
European	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	 Setting	 out	 the	 EU	 approach	 to	 Standard	 Essential	 Patents,	 Brussels,	
29.11.2017	COM(2017)	712	final,	at	p.7.	
13	2013	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	144061	at	*38	(N.D.	Ill.	2013).	
14	See,	e.g.,	Microsoft	v.	Motorola	(9th	Cir.	2014),	Ericsson	v.	D-Link	(Fed.	Cir.	2014).	
15	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	15.	
16	See	Contreras,	Aggregated	Royalties,	supra	note	8	(discussing	top-down	royalty	calculations);	Siebrasse	&	Cotter,	
supra	note	6.	
17	Id.	at	19-26.	
18	Id.	at	25.	
19	Id.	 	See	Jorge	L.	Contreras,	A	Market	Reliance	Theory	for	FRAND	Commitments	and	Other	Patent	Pledges,	2015	
UTAH	L.	REV.	479	(2015)	(discussing	“market	reliance”	on	FRAND	commitments).	
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“essential”	to	a	particular	standard	are,	upon	closer	inspection,	not	really	essential	at	all	(up	to	80%	in	
some	cases).20		This	is	the	problem	of	“over-declaration”,	and	it	occurs	because	there	is	no	verification	
by	any	third	party	of	the	essentiality	of	patents	declared	by	their	owners	to	be	SEPs.	As	a	result,	courts	
considering	 total	 royalties	 attributable	 to	 SEPs	 covering	 a	 standard	 must	 also	 consider	 how	 many	
patents	are	actually	essential	to	the	standard.		
	
	 Optional	 Portions.	 	 	 An	 initial	 question	 addressed	 by	 the	 court	 is	 whether	 patents	 covering	
optional	portions	of	a	 standard	should	be	considered	“essential”	 to	 the	standard.	 	After	analyzing	 the	
specific	 language	of	 the	ETSI	policy,	 the	court	concludes	 that	patents	covering	optional	portions	of	an	
ETSI	standard	should	not	count	as	SEPs.21	
	
	 Essentiality	Sampling.		Instead	of	analyzing	the	essentiality	of	each	patent	declared	essential	to	
the	2G,	3G	and	4G	standards,	TCL’s	experts	sampled	one-third	of	the	patents	covering	each	standard	for	
each	 of	 the	 fifteen	 largest	 patent	 holders.	 Thus,	 of	 7,106	 declared	 patent	 families	 covering	 user	
equipment,	TCL	analyzed	the	essentiality	of	approximately	2,600	patent	families.		After	various	forms	of	
cross-checking,	it	determined	that	a	total	of	413	patent	families	were	essential	to	the	2G	standard,	1,076	
to	3G	and	1,673	 to	4G.22		 Interestingly,	 it	 appears	 that	 TCL’s	 experts	 charged	approximately	 $100	per	
patent	 for	 this	 analysis,23	which	 is	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	 $10,000	 per	 patent	 that	 is	 generally	
acknowledged	as	 the	cost	of	essentiality	analyses	 for	patent	pools	 (some	figures	are	collected	here).24	
One	of	the	reasons	for	the	low	cost	of	TCL’s	analysis	was	that	TCL’s	experts	reviewed	only	the	claims	of	
the	 examined	 patents,	 not	 the	 full	 specifications.	 	 Given	 that	 a	 review	 of	 patent	 specifications	 could	
have	resulted	in	additional	patents	being	found	non-essential,25	the	court	adjusts	the	totals	downward	
to	arrive	at	365	SEPs	covering	2G,	953	covering	3G	and	1,481	covering	4G.26	
	
	 Ericsson’s	 Share.	 	 To	 compute	 Ericsson’s	 share	 of	 SEPs	 covering	 the	 relevant	 standards	 (the	
numerator),	 the	parties’	experts	determined	which	of	 the	SEPs	already	 identified	would	be	owned	by	
Ericsson	during	the	term	of	a	5-year	(60-month)	license.27		Under	the	holding	of	Brulotte	v.	Thys,28	which	
prohibits	 post-expiration	 patent	 royalties,	 the	 court	 eliminates	 from	 Ericsson’s	 total	 any	 patents	 that	
expired	prior	to	the	date	of	closing	arguments	(May	18,	2017).29	Interestingly,	the	court	did	not	require	
the	 elimination	 of	 expired	 SEPs	 from	 the	 total	 number	 of	 SEPs	 (the	 denominator).	 	 It	 explained	 that	
“[b]ecause	 the	 total	 aggregate	 royalty	 represents	 the	value	of	all	 expired	and	unexpired	 inventions	 in	
the	standard,	…	removing	an	expired	SEP	from	the	denominator	treats	the	invention	as	no	longer	having	
value.	 	 The	 invention	 however	 still	 has	 value,	 that	 value	 has	 merely	 been	 transferred	 to	 the	 public	
domain.	 	 To	 remove	 expired	 patents	 from	 the	 denominator	 (without	 decreasing	 the	 total	 aggregate	
royalty)	would	result	 in	transferring	the	value	from	expired	 inventions	to	the	remaining	patents	 in	the	
standard	instead	of	the	public.”30	
																																								 																				
20 	See	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 Essentiality	 and	 Standards-Essential	 Patents	 in	 CAMBRIDGE	 HANDBOOK	 OF	 TECHNICAL	
STANDARDIZATION	LAW:	COMPETITION,	ANTITRUST,	AND	PATENTS,	Ch.	13	(Jorge	L.	Contreras,	ed.,	2017).	
21	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	27.	
22	Id.	at	28-29.	
23	Id.	at	30.	
24	See	Contreras,	Essentiality,	supra	note	20	(collecting	figures).	
25	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	31.	
26	Id.	at	32.	
27	Id.	at	37.	
28	379	U.S.	29	(1964).	
29	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	36.	
30	Id.	at	36.	
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	 Interestingly,	 while	 the	 parties	 agreed	 that	 Ericsson	 held	 12	 2G	 SEPs,	 they	 disagreed	 with	
respect	to	the	number	of	3G	and	4G	SEPs	SEPs	held	by	Ericsson	(TCL	finding	19.65	3G	SEPs	and	69.88	4G	
SEPs,	 and	 Ericsson	 finding	 24.65	 3G	 SEPs	 and	 111.51	 4G	 SEPs).31		 In	 any	 event,	 even	 using	 Ericsson’s	
estimate	 of	 approximately	 150	 SEPs,	 this	 is	 a	 relatively	 modest	 share	 of	 the	 3,162	 patent	 families	
essential	to	the	2G,	3G	and	4G	standards.	
	
	 Relative	Strength.		TCL	argued	that	Ericsson’s	proportionate	share	should	be	adjusted	based	on	
the	 relative	 importance	 of	 Ericsson’s	 SEPs	 compared	 to	 other	 SEPs	 covering	 the	 standards	 at	 issue.32		
Though	Judge	Selna	did	not	accept	TCL’s	methodology	for	gauging	the	importance	of	Ericsson’s	SEPs,	it	
did	concede	that	“Ericsson’s	patent	portfolio	is	certainly	not	as	strong	or	essential	as	it	has	claimed”.33	
	
	 Geographical	Variance.		The	court	recognized	that	Ericsson’s	patent	strength	was	greatest	in	the	
U.S.	and	therefor	determined	that	a	discount	rate	should	be	applied	to	Ericsson’s	FRAND	royalty	outside	
of	 the	 U.S.	 	 It	 reasoned	 that	 “a	 global	 patent	 rate	 that	 does	 not	 account	 for	 differences	 in	 national	
patent	 strength	 provides	 the	 SEP	 owner	 a	 royalty	 based	 on	 features	 that	 are	 unpatented	 in	 many	
jurisdictions”.34	For	 the	sake	of	 simplicity,	 the	court	divided	 the	world	 into	 three	 regions:	U.S.,	Europe	
and	Rest	of	World	(ROW)	and	established	precise	discounts	for	non-U.S.	regions	for	each	standard	(e.g.,	
for	ROW,	Ericsson’s	2G	value	share	is	54.9%	of	the	U.S.	value).35	This	approach	is	significantly	more	fine-
grained	 than	 that	 taken	 by	 the	 UK	 court	 in	 Unwired	 Planet,	 which	 divided	 the	 world	 into	 just	 two	
categories:	 Major	 Markets	 (U.S.,	 Japan,	 Korea,	 India	 and	 several	 European	 countries)	 and	 all	 other	
countries,	 including	 China.	 	 The	 FRAND	 rate	 for	 non-Major	Market	 countries	 was	 simply	 50%	 of	 the	
Major	Market	rate.	
	
	 Violation	 of	 “Fair	 and	 Reasonable”	 Prong	 of	 FRAND.	 	 Even	 though	 the	 court	 does	 not	 accept	
each	of	TCL’s	methodological	steps	in	its	top-down	royalty	analysis,	the	court	finds,	on	the	basis	of	those	
portions	of	the	analysis	that	it	accepts,	that	Ericsson’s	offers	to	TCL	are	not	“fair	and	reasonable”	under	
its	ETSI	FRAND	commitment.	
	
Non-Discrimination		
	
The	court	next	analyzes	whether	Ericsson’s	offers	to	TCL	complied	with	the	non-discrimination	prong	of	
its	FRAND	commitment.	
	
	 Similarly	 Situated.	 As	 noted	 above,	 a	 FRAND	 license	must	 be	 non-discriminatory.	 	 This	means	
that	the	licensor	must	not	discriminate	against	similarly-situated	licensees.36	In	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	the	court	
undertakes	 the	most	 detailed	 analysis	 to-date	 to	 identify	 which	 firms	 are	 similarly	 situated	 with	 the	
potential	 licensee.		First,	 it	concludes	that	the	basis	for	comparison	must	be	“all	firms	reasonably	well-
																																								 																				
31	Id.	at	37.	
32	Id.	at	38-40	(this	concept	was	introduced	by	Judge	Robart	in	Microsoft	v.	Motorola,	in	which	the	court	evaluated	
both	 the	 importance	of	 the	asserted	patents	 to	 the	standard	and	 the	 importance	of	 the	standard	 to	 the	overall	
product).	
33	Id.	at	43.	
34	Id.	at	44.	
35	Id.	at	45.	
36	Id.	 at	 54.	 	 See	 also	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras	 &	 Anne	 Layne-Farrar,	Non-Discrimination	 and	 FRAND	 Commitments	 in	
CAMBRIDGE	 HANDBOOK	 OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDIZATION	 LAW:	 COMPETITION,	 ANTITRUST,	 AND	 PATENTS,	 Ch.	 12	 (Jorge	 L.	
Contreras,	ed.,	2017)	(discussing	non-discrimination	prong	of	FRAND).	
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established	 in	 the	 world	 market”	 [for	 telecommunications	 products].37		 The	 court	 expressly	 excludes	
from	 this	 group	 “local	 kings”	 –	 firms	 that	 sell	most	 of	 their	 products	 in	 a	 single	 country	 (e.g.,	 India’s	
Karbonn	and	China’s	Coolpad).38		The	firms	that	the	court	finds	to	be	similarly	situated	to	TCL	are	Apple,	
Samsung,	Huawei,	 LG,	HTC	and	 ZTE.39	Ericsson	 argued	 that	Apple	 and	 Samsung	are	not	 similar	 to	 TCL	
given	their	greater	market	shares	and	brand	recognition,	but	the	court	rejects	that	argument,	reasoning	
that	“the	prohibition	on	discrimination	would	mean	very	little	if	the	largest,	most	profitable	firms	could	
always	 be	 a	 category	 unto	 themselves	 simply	 because	 they	 were	 the	 largest	 and	 most	 profitable	
firms”.40	
	
	 The	 court	 found	 Ericsson’s	 licenses	 to	 Apple	 and	 Huawei	 to	 be	 suitable	 benchmarks	 for	
comparison	to	its	offers	to	TCL.41		This	conclusion	is	critical,	because	it	establishes	that	low	end	vendors	
like	TCL	will	be	compared	with	high	end	vendors	 like	Apple	as	to	FRAND	rates,	giving	low	end	vendors	
the	benefit	of	favorable	rate	packages	that	high	end	vendors	have	been	able	to	negotiate	with	respect	
to	far	more	expensive	products.	
	
	 Competitive	 Harm.	 	 Ericsson	 argued	 that	 in	 order	 for	 an	 instance	 of	 discrimination	 to	 violate	
Ericsson’s	FRAND	commitment,	 it	must	have	the	effect	of	“impairing	the	development	of	standards”.42		
A	similar	systemic	approach	was	taken	in	Unwired	Planet,	in	which	the	UK	court	held	that	a	violation	of	
FRAND	 would	 not	 arise	 unless	 discriminatory	 treatment	 of	 licensees	 would	 “distort	 competition”.43	
Judge	Selna	in	TCL	v.	Ericsson	takes	a	different	view,	holding	instead	that		discrimination	in	violation	of	a	
FRAND	 commitment	 can	 be	 found	 so	 long	 as	 an	 individual	 firm	 is	 harmed.	 	 He	 expressly	 rejects	 the	
application	of	an	antitrust-based	standard,	which	requires	harm	to	competition	rather	 than	harm	to	a	
competitor,	to	the	analysis	of	a	FRAND	commitment.44	
	
	 Comparison	 to	 Ericsson’s	 Offers.	 Though	 the	 options	 offered	 by	 Ericsson	 were	 complex	 and	
involved	 both	 lump	 sum	 payments	 and	 royalty	 floors	within	 certain	 ranges	 (making	 them	 difficult	 to	
compare	to	other	licenses),	the	court	estimated	that	under	one	option,	Ericsson’s	offer	to	TCL	translated	
to	a	running	royalty	on	handsets	of	approximately	1%	for	2G,	3G	and	4G,	and	under	another	option	0.8%	
-	1.0%	for	2G,	1.2%	for	3G	and	1.5%	for	4G	with	a	$2.00	per	unit	floor	and	a	$4.50	per	unit	cap.45		The	
royalty	 floor	 proposed	 by	 Ericsson	 was	 apparently	 intended	 to	 address	 TCL’s	 low	 selling	 price	 for	
handsets,	so	that	Ericsson	would	receive	an	assured	royalty	stream	no	matter	how	cheaply	TCL	priced	its	
handsets.		Slightly	different	royalty	schedules	were	proposed	for	external	modems.46	
	
	 Discrimination.		Based	on	this	analysis,	the	court	holds	that	Ericsson’s	offers	to	TCL	“are	radically	
divergent	from	the	rates	which	Ericsson	agreed	to	accept	from	licensees	similarly	situated	to	TCL”	and	
that	 Ericsson’s	 offers	 to	 TCL	 were	 therefore	 discriminatory	 and	 noncompliant	 with	 its	 FRAND	
																																								 																				
37	Id.	at	56.	
38	Id.	at	59.	
39	Id.	at	58.	
40	Id.	at	61.	
41	Id.	 at	 91	 (unfortunately,	 many	 of	 the	 specifics	 regarding	 these	 comparable	 licenses	 are	 redacted	 from	 the	
publicly	available	opinion).	
42	Id.		
43	[2017]	EWHC	711	(Pat)		at	¶501.	
44	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	91.	
45	Id.	at	90.	
46	Id.	
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obligations.47	In	particular,	the	court	holds	that	Ericsson’s	proposed	“floor”	on	royalties	payable	by	TCL	
was	discriminatory.48	This	being	said,	the	court	also	finds	that	Ericsson	negotiated	in	good	faith	and	that	
its	conduct	during	the	negotiations	did	not	violate	its	FRAND	obligations.49	
	
FRAND	Rate	Calculation	
	
Having	 concluded	 that	 Ericsson’s	 offers	 to	 TCL	 were	 not	 FRAND,	 the	 court	 proceeds	 to	 determine	 a	
FRAND	 rate	 for	 TCL’s	 desired	 license.	 It	 does	 so	 using	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 top-down	 rates	 derived	
above,	as	well	as	the	comparable	licenses	reviewed	in	its	non-discrimination	analysis.	 	Below	is	a	table	
containing	 the	 court’s	 final	 determination	 of	 FRAND	 rates	 for	 the	 different	 standards	 and	 geographic	
regions	at	issue:50	
	
	
	
	
	 Royalty	 Base	 and	 SSPPU?	 	 It	 is	 notable	 that	 the	 court’s	 decision	 in	 TCL	 v.	 Ericsson	 does	 not	
discuss	 the	 often	 contentious	 issue	 of	 the	 appropriate	 royalty	 “base”	 for	 TCL’s	 products	 –	 the	 figure	
against	 which	 the	 percentage	 royalty	 is	 applied.	 	 As	 explained	 in	 cases	 such	 as	 Ericsson	 v.	 D-Link,51	
parties	often	disagree	whether	the	SEP	holder’s	royalty	should	be	applied	against	a	component	(e.g.,	a	
chip)	embodying	the	standardized	technology	or	against	an	end	user	product	such	as	a	smart	phone.		If	
the	 percentage	 royalty	 rate	 is	 not	 adjusted,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 royalty	 base	 could	 result	 in	 radically	
different	payments	to	the	SEP	holder.	This	concern	has	led	to	debates	over	the	appropriateness	of	using	
constructs	 such	 as	 the	 “smallest	 salable	 patent	 practicing	 unit”	 (SSPPU)	 as	 the	 royalty	 base.	 	 I	
understand	 that	 this	 debate	 was	 largely	 avoided	 in	 this	 case	 because	 TCL	 conceded	 that	 the	 royalty	
would	be	charged	against	the	selling	price	of	its	handset	units.		
	
																																								 																				
47	Id.	at	94.	
48	Id.	at	113.	
49	Id.	at	3.	
50	Id.	at	104.	
51	773	F.3d	1201	(Fed.	Cir.	2014).	
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Holding	and	Conclusions	
	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 findings,	 the	 court	 prescribes	 that	 the	 parties	 enter	 into	 a	 5-year	 license	
agreement	 reflecting	 the	 FRAND	 rates	 described	 above. 52 	In	 addition,	 TCL	 must	 pay	 Ericsson	
approximately	$16.5	million	for	past	unlicensed	sales.			
	
While	the	outcome	of	this	case	will	likely	make	it	easier	for	firms	such	as	TCL	to	compete	in	the	U.S.	and	
other	 major	 markets,	 it	 also	 establishes	 several	 important	 guideposts	 for	 future	 FRAND	 license	
negotiations.	First,	the	case	establishes	that,	for	non-discrimination	purposes,	even	low	end	vendors	like	
TCL	will	be	considered	“similarly	situated”	to	high	end	vendors	like	Apple,	giving	them	the	benefit	of	the	
rates	 that	 high	 end	 vendors	 negotiate	with	 SEP	 holders	 for	much	more	 expensive	 products.	 	 Equally	
importantly,	it	highlights	the	growing	predominance	of	top-down	royalty	calculation	methodologies	for	
FRAND	licenses.	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
52	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	115.	
